AuthorProfile for László Á. Kóczy
Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective
Péter Csóka
László Kóczy
A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
László Á. Kóczy
The Invariant Method is Manipulable
László Á. Kóczy
Martin Strobel
Központi felvételi rendszerek: Taktikázás és stabilitás
László Á. Kóczy
Proportional power is free from paradoxes
László Á. Kóczy
A Note On Funaki And Yamato's Tragedy Of The Commons
László Á. Kóczy
The Core in the Presence of Externalities
Enrico Mattei
László Á. Kóczy
Measuring Voting Power: The Paradox of New Members vs. the Null Player Axiom.
László Á. Kóczy
A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
László Á. Kóczy
A Nonempty Extension Of The Core
László Á. Kóczy
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Koczy, Laszlo A.
Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom
László Á. Kóczy
Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
László Á. Kóczy
Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach
László Á. Kóczy
Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements
Kóczy, László Á.
A recursive core for partition function form games
Kóczy, László Á
Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
László Á. Kóczy
Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective
Kóczy, László Á.
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
László Á. Kóczy
Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
Kóczy, László Á.
The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
Koczy, Laszlo A.
Cooperative Models for Extending the European Union
László Á. Kóczy
The Core In Normal Form Games
László Á. Kóczy
The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
Stable Allocations of Risk
Kóczy, László Á
The coalition structure core is accessible
Koczy, Laszlo A.
The Core Of A Partition Function Game
László Á. Kóczy
Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
Péter Csóka
László Á. Kóczy
Miklós Pintér
The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks
Kóczy, László Á.
Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Approach
Lszl J. Koczy
Stable allocations of risk
Kóczy, László Á.
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Laszlo A. Koczy
Luc Lauwers
The Core of a Normal Form Game
László Á. Kóczy
The Coalition Structure Core Is Accessible
Laszlo A. Koczy
Luc Lauwers
A Characterisation Theorem of the Logarithmic Function Modulo 1
L. Á. Kóczy
The Core of a Partition Function Game
László Á. Kóczy
The Core can be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
László Á Kóczy
Stable Allocations of Risk
Péter Csóka
László Á. Kóczy
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.
Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
László Á. Kóczy
The Minimal Dominant Set Is A Non-Empty Core-Extension
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
Koczy, Laszlo A.
Stable Allocations of Risk
Peter Csoka
Laszlo A. Koczy
The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks
Laszlo. A. Koczy
Article length bias in journal rankings
Kóczy László Á.
Nichifor Alexandru
Strobel Martin
Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
Csóka Péter
Kóczy László Á.
Pintér Miklós
The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
László Á. Kóczy
Finding the Best Way to Join in: A Dynamic Accession Game
László Kóczy
The Core in the Presence of Externalities
A. Koczy
Johan Eyckmans
Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
Péter Csóka
László Á. Kóczy
Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
Kóczy, László Á.
Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Approach
László Á. Kóczy
Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
Kóczy, László Á.
Article length bias in journal rankings
László Á. Kóczy
Alexandru Nichifor
Martin Strobel
Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core
Kóczy, László Á.
The Core can be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
Laszlo A. Koczy
Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities
Kóczy, Lászlo Á.
Voting Paradoxes and the Human Intuition
Kóczy, Lászlo Á.
Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
László Á. Kóczy
Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
László Á. Kóczy
The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
The Core of a Partition Function Game
Laszlo A. Koczy
The Invariant Method is Manipulable
Kóczy, László Á.
Strobel Martin
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers
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